TagRussian influence

Stopping Russian Cyberattacks at Their Source [Published in Dark Reading]

Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash

In 2016, Lazarus, a notorious hacking group, aimed to steal a billion dollars through the SWIFT interbank communication system. How did the group do it? Social engineering.

Using an innocuous email purporting to be from a job applicant, the hackers gained entry into Bangladesh’s central bank system almost a year earlier. Once in, they learned how SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) worked and began to transfer a billion dollars from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The heist was accidentally discovered when a staffer at the bank staffer rebooted a hacked printer, which spit out the New York Fed’s confirmation messages in its queue. This stalled that hack, but not before $81 million was stolen.

Lazarus Group members were from North Korea. Its hackers, given the limited access to computing, aren’t the best. Russia’s are. They have developed some of the most potent malware we have seen yet. And if China were to team up with Russia, and there is evidence it is likely to, then we are in for some increasingly brazen attacks.

For context, every major hack in the past decade has origins in one of these nations. Russian hackers slipped malicious code into SolarWinds’ Orion program and got access to the Pentagon and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the DHS office responsible for protecting federal networks. Most ransomware also has roots in Russia. Estimates are that one in three organizations globally is a victim of these attacks, and they are enormously lucrative for hackers. Last year, the meat packer JBS paid $11 million in ransom; Colonial Pipeline paid $5 million. Some of it was recovered, but all of us paid through increased prices. And almost all of this involved social engineering.

Add to this the hacking prowess of China. Data stolen from sources as varied as from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to every major retailer can be traced to China. According to reports, sophisticated mining operations there are helping Russians craft highly persuasive social engineering attacks.

Growing Russian Hacker Threat
Once isolated and removed from banking systems such as SWIFT, it’s a question of time until Russia turns more sharply toward hacking. And if the country’s currency implodes further and it no longer cares about the rules-based global economy, there will be no way to hold it to account and disruptions will increase. We will end up paying through ransom payments, supply shortages, and higher prices. We have to stop this at its source by protecting users — all of us — the primary conduit through which malware gets into organizations.

While at long last two major cybersecurity bills mandating ransomware reporting are being considered by Congress, the defense of users is still being ignored. That’s because our cybersecurity defense relies on technology vendors. The tech sector’s motivation is to develop more technology. We today have more proprietary technology, with more licenses being sold, than ever before. Bank of America, which a decade ago was spending $400 million on cybersecurity, is now spending a billion dollars. And after all that, thousands of the bank’s California customers’ were still hacked last year.

How Do We Prevent Cyberattacks?
We need to change this paradigm. We need to invest in open source tools that are developed through private-public partnerships and make licenses available free of charge for at least the first five years to all organizations. This way, they can be applied widely, openly tested, and their value in organizational security can be ascertained.

The same extends to user training — one of the most widely applied, proactive cybersecurity solutions against spear-phishing. Almost all training today left to vendors, which offer many fee-based training programs. But how good is any of this? There is little data from cybersecurity firms on their effectiveness. The withholding of data has covered inefficiencies in training, which research studies repeatedly point out, and is extremely dangerous because the training programs give organizations a false sense of readiness.

Audits Are Needed
We need audits of organizational training, conducted by independent groups that aren’t motivated by the possibility of selling something more. CISA could set up such a team in the federal government that demonstrates how this can be accomplished. This can serve as a blueprint for IT managers in organizations, who are naturally risk-averse and less inclined to allow anyone to peer into their performance.

Finally, we need to get our netizens prepared for what’s coming. Like the civil defense drills we performed in the 1970s, we need to have cybersecurity drills that make everyone adept at dealing with social engineering. Everyone should have access to free security training and open source backup and threat-detection tools. Organizations should make multifactor authentication the default on all online services. The same goes for credit and identity protection. All of our credit should be locked by default, and credit monitoring, which is a fee-based service, should be free.

Stopping cyberattacks is no longer an option. It is an existential requirement. We may not be able to put our boots on the ground to fight the Russians, but we must ensure that neither our data nor our money help fund their war efforts.

 

*A version of this post was published in Dark Reading

Spearphishing has become even more dangerous [Published in CNN]

The continued prosecution of “All the President’s Men” does little to stop the Russians from attempting to influence America’s upcoming midterm elections. And reports from Missourito Californiasuggest they are already looking for our cyber weaknesses to exploit.

Chief among these: spear phishing—emails containing hyperlinks to fake websites—that the Russians used to hack into the DNC emails and set in motion their 2016 influence campaign.

After two years of congressional hearings, indictments, and investigations, spear phishing not only continues to be the commonest attack used by hackers, but the Russians are still trying to use it against us.

The is because in the ensuing time, spear phishing has become even more virulent, thanks to the availability of sophisticated malware, some stolen from intelligence agencies; troves of people’s personal information from previous breaches; and ongoing developments in machine learning that can deep-dive into this data and craft highly effective attacks.

Just last week, Microsoft blocked six fake websitesthat were likely to be used for spear phishing the US Senate by the same Russian intelligence unit responsible for the 2016 DNC hack

But the Internet is vast and there are many more fundamental weaknesses still available for exploit.

Take the URLs with which we identify websites. Thanks to Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)that allow websites to be registered in languages other than English, many fake websites used for spear phishing are registered using homoglyphs— characters from languages that look like English language characters. For instance, a fake domain for Amazon.com could be registered by replacing the English “a” or “o” with their Cyrillic equivalents. Such URLs are hard for people to discern visually and even email scanning programs, trained to flag words like “password” which are common in phishing emails, like the one the Russians in 2016 used to hack into Jon Podesta’s emails, can be tricked. And while many browsers prevent URLs with homoglyphs from being displayed, some like Firefox still expect users to alter their browser settings for protection.

Making things worse is the proliferation of Certification Authorities (CA), the organizations issuing digital certificates that make the lock icon and HTTPS appear next to a website’s name on browsers. While users are taught to trust these symbols, an estimated one in four phishing websites actually have HTTPS certificates. This is because some CA’s have been hacked, meaning there are many roguecertificates out there, while some others have doled out free certificates to just about anyone. For instance, one CA last year issued certificates to15000 websites with names containing some combination of the word PayPal—all for spear phishing.

Besides these, the problem of phony social media profiles, which the Russians used in 2016 for phishing, trolling and spreading fake news, remains intractable. Just last week, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported a social media phishing campaign by Hamas, luring its troops to download malware using fake social media profiles on Facebook, Instagram, and Whatsapp. Also last week, Facebook, followed by Twitter, blocked profiles linked to Iranian and Russian operatives being used for spreading misinformation.

These attacks, however, reveal a critical weakness of influence campaigns: by design, they utilize overlapping profiles in multiple platforms. Yet, today, social media organizations internally police their networks and keep information in their own “walled gardens.”

A better solution would be to therefore host data on suspect profiles and pages in a unified, open-source repository, one that accepts inputs from other media organizations, security organizations, even users who find things awry. Such an approach would help detect and track coordinated social media influence campaigns—which would be of enormous value to law enforcement and even media organizations big and small, many of which get targeted using the same profiles.

A platform for this could be the Certificate Transparencyframework, where digital certificates are openly logged and verified, which has been adopted by many popular browsers and operating systems. For now, this framework only audits digital certificates but, it could be expanded to encompass domain name auditing and social media pages.

Finally, we must improve user education. Most users know little about homoglyphs and even less about how to change their browser settings to ensure against them. Furthermore, many users, after being repeatedly trained to look for HTTPS icons on websites, have come to implicitly trust them. Many even mistake such symbols to mean that a website is legitimate. Because even an encrypted site could be fraudulent, users have to be taught to be cautious, and to assess website factors ranging from the spelling used in the domain name, to the quality of information on the website, to its digital certificate and the CA who issued it. Such initiatives must be complemented with better, more uniform Internet browser design, so users do not have to tinker with settings to ensure against being phished. 

Achieving all this requires leadership, but the White House, which ordinarily would be best positioned to address them, recently fired its cybersecurity czar and eliminated the role. And when according to GAO, federal agencies have yet to address over a third of its 3000 cybersecurity recommendations, the President instead talks about developing a Space Force. Last we knew the Martians haven’t landed, but the Russians sure are probing our computer systems.

 

*A version of this post was published in CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/01/opinions/spear-phishing-has-become-even-more-dangerous-opinion-vishwanath/index.html